GridinSoft Threat Intelligence
VLC media player file report
Why it matters
Evidence available for this file
No final classification is available yet.
First seen 2017-06-27 09:09:51 (8 years ago); latest analysis 2024-04-01 23:07:24 (2 years ago).
Company metadata: VideoLAN. Product metadata: VLC media player.
Signed by VideoLAN. The signature is reported as valid, but signed files can still be bundled or abused.
This hash has appeared under multiple file names, which can happen with repackaging, bundling, or deliberate renaming.
ThreatInfo has seen this file in user or system paths listed below. Unexpected locations increase the need for local verification.
Recommended action
What to do next
- Use the hash and metadata below to verify the exact file identity.
- Review publisher, signature, paths, and PE details for inconsistencies.
- Run a local scan if the file appears unexpectedly or starts with Windows.
File context
VLC media player is a Windows file recorded in the ThreatInfo database. It is associated with VLC media player. The reported company name is VideoLAN. The current detection status is Undefined, based on the latest analysis from 2024-04-01 23:07:24 (2 years ago).
ThreatInfo does not have a final classification for this file yet. Use the technical details below to compare the hash, size, signature, and observed locations with the copy found on your device.
File Details
| Product Name: | VLC media player |
| Company Name: | VideoLAN |
| MD5: | acc319a90a453fa07591c47517f5dba6 |
| Size: | 29 KB |
| First Published: | 2017-06-27 09:09:51 (8 years ago) |
| Latest Published: | 2024-04-01 23:07:24 (2 years ago) |
| Status: | Undefined (on last analysis) | |
| Analysis Date: | 2024-04-01 23:07:24 (2 years ago) |
Overview
| Signed By: | VideoLAN |
| Status: | Valid |
The signature on VLC media player is reported as valid. A valid signature helps confirm publisher identity, but it does not automatically make the file safe if the installer was bundled, abused, or downloaded from an untrusted source.
Common Places:
| %programfiles%\tencent\weiyundisk\bin\plugins\video_chroma |
| %appdata%\zona\plugins\zvlcj\plugins\video_chroma |
| %appdata%\systweak\advanced system~protector\quarantine\pua.zona |
| %programfiles%\tencent\weiyundisk\weiyundisk\bin\plugins\video_chroma |
| %programfiles%\tencent\weiyundisk\bin\plugins |
| %programfiles%\tencent\weiyundisk\weiyundisk\bin\plugins |
| %programfiles%\tencent\weiyundisk\weiyundisk\weiyundisk\bin\plugins |
| %localappdata%\catalinagroup\citrio\user data\default\extensions\hjinflocgjpjihbgdlipilmjlbkjkmak\0.6.7_0\binaries\win\plugins |
ThreatInfo has observed VLC media player in the locations listed above. Files found in temporary folders, user profile folders, startup locations, or unusual application directories should be reviewed more carefully than files installed under a known program directory.
File Names:
3 observed namesThis hash has been seen with multiple file names. Alternate names can appear when software is updated, copied between folders, packed by an installer, or deliberately renamed to avoid recognition. Compare the exact MD5 above before assuming two names refer to the same file.
Geographic signal
Observed country distribution
ThreatInfo has seen VLC media player across 16 countries. Use this signal to compare local evidence with where the sample is most often reported.
The strongest geographic signal for this file is China with 21.1% of observed hits. Geographic distribution can help identify targeted campaigns, regional software bundles, or where a file is most commonly reported.
OS Version:
The most common operating system signal for VLC media player is Windows 10 with 75.9% of observed hits. If your system differs from the common profile, check whether the file was introduced by a specific installer, archive, or removable device.
Analysis
VLC media player is identified as pe for 32-bit systems. The subsystem is Windows CUI. PE header values are useful for triage, especially when they do not match the expected publisher, product, or release timeline.
PE Sections:
Section layout highlights raw-size concentration, repeated names, packer markers, and hashes that can be compared across related samples.
7825c22929d38d7e3efa4b41c78663dd
5d5776d3ee52c6a068abf50231b12d32
3d468a7611dc261844d1b671dcfb01cd
00000000000000000000000000000000
94067cd50a1184a1186cae1dd36af753
46c5f881f6026d2d7ef2d3d334fdca59
ba1e5ae59eddfbeb949d3e4096ee2cf1
7e0aee543e92ae6dcf5d0809a2a7873a
fdaece0823f7fdf8f40cbb2efd41aed6
1508e6a75572cd1e628d5a55da44f390
c65467cbff4a7a3e2938fd94a835f907
PE section names and hashes can reveal packing, injected resources, or unusual build artifacts. Sections with uncommon names, very large raw data, or hashes that differ from a trusted copy deserve additional review.
Report conclusion
This file is still under review
ThreatInfo has not assigned a final verdict yet. Compare the file hash, location, signature, and publisher before trusting the file on a production system.