GridinSoft Threat Intelligence
VLC media player file report
Why it matters
Evidence available for this file
No final classification is available yet.
First seen 2017-06-27 09:09:46 (8 years ago); latest analysis 2024-04-01 23:07:17 (2 years ago).
Company metadata: VideoLAN. Product metadata: VLC media player.
Signed by VideoLAN. The signature is reported as valid, but signed files can still be bundled or abused.
This hash has appeared under multiple file names, which can happen with repackaging, bundling, or deliberate renaming.
ThreatInfo has seen this file in user or system paths listed below. Unexpected locations increase the need for local verification.
Recommended action
What to do next
- Use the hash and metadata below to verify the exact file identity.
- Review publisher, signature, paths, and PE details for inconsistencies.
- Run a local scan if the file appears unexpectedly or starts with Windows.
File context
VLC media player is a Windows file recorded in the ThreatInfo database. It is associated with VLC media player. The reported company name is VideoLAN. The current detection status is Undefined, based on the latest analysis from 2024-04-01 23:07:17 (2 years ago).
ThreatInfo does not have a final classification for this file yet. Use the technical details below to compare the hash, size, signature, and observed locations with the copy found on your device.
File Details
| Product Name: | VLC media player |
| Company Name: | VideoLAN |
| MD5: | 7acf76df7a68a83972515759572b30ec |
| Size: | 26 KB |
| First Published: | 2017-06-27 09:09:46 (8 years ago) |
| Latest Published: | 2024-04-01 23:07:17 (2 years ago) |
| Status: | Undefined (on last analysis) | |
| Analysis Date: | 2024-04-01 23:07:17 (2 years ago) |
Overview
| Signed By: | VideoLAN |
| Status: | Valid |
The signature on VLC media player is reported as valid. A valid signature helps confirm publisher identity, but it does not automatically make the file safe if the installer was bundled, abused, or downloaded from an untrusted source.
Common Places:
| %programfiles%\tencent\weiyundisk\bin\plugins\access_output |
| %appdata%\zona\plugins\zvlcj\plugins\access_output |
| %appdata%\systweak\advanced system~protector\quarantine\pua.zona |
| %programfiles%\tencent\weiyundisk\weiyundisk\bin\plugins\access_output |
| %programfiles%\tencent\weiyundisk\bin\plugins |
| %programfiles%\tencent\weiyundisk\weiyundisk\bin\plugins |
| %programfiles%\tencent\weiyundisk\weiyundisk\weiyundisk\bin\plugins |
| %localappdata%\catalinagroup\citrio\user data\default\extensions\hjinflocgjpjihbgdlipilmjlbkjkmak\0.6.7_0\binaries\win\plugins |
ThreatInfo has observed VLC media player in the locations listed above. Files found in temporary folders, user profile folders, startup locations, or unusual application directories should be reviewed more carefully than files installed under a known program directory.
File Names:
3 observed namesThis hash has been seen with multiple file names. Alternate names can appear when software is updated, copied between folders, packed by an installer, or deliberately renamed to avoid recognition. Compare the exact MD5 above before assuming two names refer to the same file.
Geographic signal
Observed country distribution
ThreatInfo has seen VLC media player across 16 countries. Use this signal to compare local evidence with where the sample is most often reported.
The strongest geographic signal for this file is China with 20.7% of observed hits. Geographic distribution can help identify targeted campaigns, regional software bundles, or where a file is most commonly reported.
OS Version:
The most common operating system signal for VLC media player is Windows 10 with 76.3% of observed hits. If your system differs from the common profile, check whether the file was introduced by a specific installer, archive, or removable device.
Analysis
VLC media player is identified as pe for 32-bit systems. The subsystem is Windows CUI. PE header values are useful for triage, especially when they do not match the expected publisher, product, or release timeline.
PE Sections:
Section layout highlights raw-size concentration, repeated names, packer markers, and hashes that can be compared across related samples.
b31ea2f6f9c27310ecce0103580dd3df
d4f7de931a329c7101970a2232d529fc
89fca6215b51c8643c54c1bd8312b8bf
00000000000000000000000000000000
d3c58588ac7d293ead8f2e93fa2c6286
1464efdcf1d840e704b6693537e942b0
de705d68bd4f064cf7081c9f3871f1ff
7b6f67d46ac8052c81febe857064090f
1bef3a5d30c648764cd055adbf0c80cf
9c9a01e5932b622b78d2edb733d9e8fc
73527658eaaeeabbb213feef2cb9a3f7
PE section names and hashes can reveal packing, injected resources, or unusual build artifacts. Sections with uncommon names, very large raw data, or hashes that differ from a trusted copy deserve additional review.
Report conclusion
This file is still under review
ThreatInfo has not assigned a final verdict yet. Compare the file hash, location, signature, and publisher before trusting the file on a production system.